In the wake of the explosion of the 1986 space shuttle Challenger, a conventional explanation for the tragedy emerged: the economic strain on NASA caused managers to withhold information about safety violations in order to maintain the launch schedule. In her book, Diane Vaughan contradicts this conventional explanation by providing a sociological explanation of the tragedy. Vaughan analyzes archival data and interviews to create a detailed historical account that answers why, in the years preceding the Challenger launch, NASA continued launching with a design that was known to be flawed. In addition, Vaughan also discusses why NASA launched the Challenger against the eve-of-launch objections of engineers. Vaughan’s book describes how workplace cultures are created and sustained, and how they affect decision making. Vaughan also explains how mistakes and disasters are socially organized and systemically created by social structures. Over time, the result is a process Vaughan calls “the normalization of deviance”. Overall, the book provides insight into macro-micro connections in organizational analysis, and meticulously explores the risks inherent in organizations that deal with cutting edge technology.